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Exploring the Macroeconomic 
Impacts of Low-Carbon Energy 
Transitions: A Simulation Analysis 
for Kenya and Ghana
Dirk Willenbockel, Helen Hoka Osiolo and 
Simon Bawakyillenuo
Abstract The study applies purpose-built dynamic computable general 
equilibrium models for Kenya and Ghana with a disaggregated 
country-specific representation of the power sector, to simulate the 
prospective medium-run growth and distributional implications associated 
with a shift towards a higher share of renewables in the power mix, up to 
2025. In both countries, the share of fossil fuel-based thermal electricity 
generation in the power mix will increase sharply over the next decade 
and beyond according to current national energy sector development plans. 
The overarching general message suggested by the simulation results is 
that in both countries it appears feasible to reduce the carbon content 
of electricity generation significantly without adverse consequences for 
economic growth and without noteworthy distributional effects.
Keywords: low-carbon growth, scenario analysis, CGE, green growth, 
renewable energy, climate change mitigation, sustainable energy.
1 Introduction
This study provides a forward-looking simulation analysis of  
economy-wide and distributional implications associated with 
alternative pathways for the development of  the electricity sector in 
Kenya and Ghana. From an economic perspective, significant shifts in 
the power mix of  an economy, as well as policy measures to induce or 
support such shifts, are bound to affect the structure of  domestic prices 
across the whole economy with repercussions for the growth prospects 
of  different production sectors and for the real income growth paths of  
different socioeconomic groups. Understanding these economy-wide 
repercussions is crucial for a study concerned with the obstacles to – and 
political feasibility of  – adopting a low-carbon growth strategy. The 
analysis requires the adoption of  a multisectoral general equilibrium 
approach that allows the capture of  the input–output linkages between 
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the electricity sector and the rest of  the economy, as well as the linkages 
between production activity, household income and expenditure, and 
government policy.
Thus, we employ purpose-built dynamic computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models for Kenya and Ghana with a detailed country-specific 
representation of  the power sector to simulate the prospective 
medium-run growth and distributional implications associated with a 
shift towards a higher share of  renewables in the power mix, up to 2025.
The following section explains the methodological approach and 
describes the key features of  the CGE models in a non-technical 
manner. Each model is calibrated to a social accounting matrix (SAM) 
which reflects the observed input–output structure of  production, 
the commodity composition of  demand, and the pattern of  income 
distribution for the country at a disaggregated level at the start of  
the simulation horizon. Section 3 spells out the data sources for the 
construction of  the social accounting matrices and outlines the model 
calibration process. Sections 4 and 5 present the results of  the dynamic 
simulation analysis for Kenya and Ghana respectively. In each case, we 
first develop a stylised baseline scenario that simulates the evolution of  
the economy under current power sector expansion plans up to 2025 
and then contrast this baseline with an alternative lower-carbon energy 
scenario. Furthermore, the sensitivity of  results to alternative projections 
for world market fossil fuel prices is explored. Section 6 draws conclusions.
2 The analytic framework
2.1 Rationale for the adoption of a CGE approach
CGE models are widely used tools in energy and climate mitigation policy 
analysis.1 The prime appeal of  adopting a general equilibrium approach 
to energy policy and energy-related environmental policy analysis arises 
from the fact that energy is an input to virtually every economic activity. 
Hence, changes in the energy sector ‘will ripple through multiple markets, 
with far larger consequences than energy’s small share of  national income 
might suggest’ (Sue Wing 2009: 2). The unique advantage of  the CGE 
approach over partial equilibrium approaches is its ability to incorporate 
these ‘ripple effects’ in a systematic manner.
In contrast to partial equilibrium approaches, CGE models consider 
all sectors in an economy simultaneously and take consistent account 
of  economy-wide resource constraints, intersectoral intermediate 
input–output linkages, and interactions between markets for goods and 
services on the one hand, and primary factor markets including labour 
markets on the other. CGE models simulate the full circular flow of  
income in an economy from (i) income generation through productive 
activity, to (ii) the primary distribution of  that income to workers, 
owners of  productive capital, and recipients of  the proceeds from land 
and other natural resource endowments, to (iii) the redistribution of  that 
income through taxes and transfers, and to (iv) the use of  that income 
for consumption and investment (Pueyo et al. 2015).
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2.2 Specification of the dynamic CGE models for Kenya and Ghana
In terms of  theoretical pedigree, the CGE models for Kenya and 
Ghana employed in this study can be characterised as modified dynamic 
extensions of  standard comparative-static single-country CGE models 
for developing countries in the tradition of  Dervis, de Melo and 
Robinson (1982), Robinson et al. (1999), and Lofgren et al. (2002). Models 
belonging to this class have been widely used in applied development 
policy research. Apart from the incorporation of  capital accumulation, 
population growth, labour force growth, and technical progress,2 
the main difference to the standard model is a more sophisticated 
specification of  the electricity sector as detailed in Sections 2.2.2 and 3.2.
2.2.1 Domestic production and input demand
Domestic producers in the model are price-takers in output and input 
markets and maximise intra-temporal profits subject to technology 
constraints. The technologies for the transformation of  inputs into real 
outputs are described by sectoral constant-returns-to-scale production 
functions. In line with common practice in energy-focused, top-down 
CGE models,3 technology specifications belonging to the generic class 
of  KLEM (Capital (K), Labour, Energy, Materials) production functions 
are employed to capture substitution possibilities among energy and 
non-energy inputs and among different energy sources.
2.2.2 Electricity supply
In standard energy-focused top-down CGE models, electricity 
generation and distribution is typically treated as a single production 
activity. In these models, a transition towards a higher share of  hydro, 
solar, or wind in the power mix is represented in a highly stylised abstract 
form as a substitution of  fossil fuel inputs by physical capital under the 
assumption of  a continuous space of  available technologies. The lack of  
explicit detail with regard to the characterisation of  current and future 
technology options entails the danger that simulation results may violate 
fundamental physical restrictions such as the conservation of  matter 
and energy (Böhringer and Rutherford 2008) or exceed other technical 
feasibility limits (McFarland, Reilly and Herzog 2004; Hourcade 
et al. 2006). Moreover, the lack of  technological explicitness limits the 
ability of  top-down models to incorporate detailed information on cost 
differentials among alternative energy technologies from engineering 
cost studies (Hourcade et al. 2006). In response to these limitations 
of  conventional top-down CGE models, various approaches to the 
incorporation of  detailed ‘bottom-up’ information on energy technology 
options into a CGE modelling framework have emerged.4
The present study adopts a similar hybrid top-down bottom-up 
approach by decomposing electricity generation according to power 
source and by treating transmission and distribution (T&D) as a separate 
activity. This approach enables us to incorporate extant information 
on levelised cost of  electricity (LCOE) differentials by power source 
into the simulation analysis and to consider exogenous policy-driven 
changes in the power mix that are not necessarily driven by changes in 
52 | Willenbockel et al. Exploring the Macroeconomic Impacts of Low-Carbon Energy Transitions: A Simulation Analysis for Kenya and Ghana
Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’
relative market prices. A consideration of  off-grid renewable generation 
scenarios is beyond the remit of  the present study and beyond the scope 
of  the models applied here.5
2.2.3 Primary factor supply
The model distinguishes skilled and unskilled labour. The dynamic 
labour supply paths are exogenous and both types of  labour are 
intersectorally mobile. The supply of  agricultural land and natural 
resource endowments is imperfectly elastic, i.e. the supply of  these 
primary factors varies endogenously in response to changes in the 
corresponding factor price. The accumulation of  productive capital 
by sector is co-determined by capital return differentials – i.e. sectoral 
investment is a positive function of  a sector’s rate of  return to capital 
relative to the economy-wide average return to capital.
2.2.4 Final domestic demand
Consumer behaviour is derived from intra-temporal utility-maximising 
behaviour subject to within-period budget constraints. The commodity 
composition of  investment and government demand is kept constant 
according to the observed shares in the benchmark SAM, while the 
total volumes of  government and investment demand grow in line 
with aggregate income and are determined by the macro closure rules 
detailed in Section 2.2.6.
2.2.5 International trade
In all traded commodity groups, imports and goods of  domestic origin 
are treated as imperfect substitutes in both final and intermediate 
demand. The equilibrium ratio of  imports to domestic goods in any 
traded commodity group varies endogenously with the corresponding 
relative price of  imports to domestically produced output in that 
commodity group. On the supply side, the model takes account of  
product differentiation between exports to the rest of  the world and 
production for the domestic market in all exporting sectors. The 
equilibrium ratio of  exports to domestic goods in any exporting sector 
is determined by the price relation between export and home market 
sales. Both Kenya and Ghana are treated as small open economies – 
i.e. changes in their export supply and import demand quantity have no 
influence on the structure of  world market prices.
2.2.6 Equilibrium conditions and macro closure
The prices for goods, services, and primary factors are flexible and 
adjust in order to satisfy the market clearing conditions for output 
and factor markets. Foreign savings and hence the current account 
balance follow an exogenous time path. This time path is kept fixed 
across the simulation scenarios considered in subsequent sections in 
order to enable meaningful welfare comparisons across the scenarios. 
This external sector closure entails that the real exchange rate adjusts 
endogenously to maintain external balance-of-payments equilibrium. 
A standard balanced macroeconomic closure rule (Lofgren et al. 2002) 
is adopted, according to which the shares of  government demand, 
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investment demand, and hence private household consumption 
demand in total absorption remain invariant. Under this macro closure, 
household and government saving rates adjust residually to establish the 
macroeconomic saving–investment balance.
3 Data sources and model calibration
3.1 The social accounting matrices for Kenya and Ghana: overview
Each model is calibrated to a SAM which reflects the input–output 
structure of  production, the commodity composition of  demand, and the 
pattern of  income distribution for the country at a disaggregated level at 
the start of  the simulation horizon. Starting point for the construction of  
the model-conformable SAMs are the input–output matrices for Kenya 
and Ghana contained in the GTAP 9 database (Aguiar, Narayanan 
and McDougall 2016). This data set provides a detailed and internally 
consistent representation of  the global economy-wide structure of  
production, demand, and international trade at a regionally and sectorally 
disaggregated level for the benchmark year 2011.6
The GTAP database treats electricity generation, transmission, and 
distribution as a single aggregate activity and the data on household 
income and household consumer expenditure are for a single aggregate 
household. For the purposes of  the present study, both the electricity 
activity and the household sector are disaggregated as detailed in 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
3.2 Disaggregation of the electricity sector
For Kenya, the electricity activity is disaggregated into T&D, hydro, 
geothermal, thermal, and wind. The electricity sector decomposition 
for Ghana splits the sector into T&D, hydro, and thermal. From a SAM 
perspective, the decomposition of  the power activity for each country 
involves splitting the single electricity activity of  the original GTAP 
input–output matrix into the various electricity subsectors distinguished 
in the CGE models in such a way that (i) the cost composition by input 
type in the subsectors is adequately represented; (ii) the contribution of  
each subsector to value-added and gross output value of  the electricity 
sector is captured; and (iii) the accounting consistency of  the SAM is 
Table 1 Levelised cost of electricity by technology and country (US cents/KWh)
 Ghana Kenya
Hydro 6.8–11.2 7.4–10.9
Wind 12.6–19.5 7.7–10.3
Geothermal Not applicable 4.7–7.5
Solar PV 16.0–26.9 9.9–14.8
Thermal – oil 19.0 26.0–42.0
Thermal – gas 13.0 13.3
Source Pueyo et al. (2016).
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preserved. To perform this non-trivial task, we combine data on the 
cost composition for different power generation technologies as well as 
for transmission and distribution from Peters (2016), Sue Wing (2008), 
and Lehr et al. (2011) with the LCOE estimates for Kenya and Ghana 
(Table 1) by Pueyo, Bawakyillenuo and Osiolo (2016) and data on 
the power mix in the benchmark year reported in Republic of  Kenya 
(2014) and EnCG (2016). A matrix-balancing algorithm is employed to 
establish full SAM consistency.7
3.3 Disaggregation of the household accounts
The household disaggregation for Ghana distinguishes five household 
groups – labelled H1 (bottom quintile) to H5 (top quintile) – by 
household income quintile in the benchmark year, and is based on 
income and expenditure data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey 
(GLSS 6; GSS 2014). The available data do not support a consistent 
rural–urban split at the level of  detail required for SAM construction 
purposes. The household sector decomposition for Kenya draws upon 
the household disaggregation generated by Kiringai et al. (2007). The 
Kenya model distinguishes four household groups – labelled Rural Low, 
Rural High, Urban Low and Urban High – which represent respectively 
the bottom and top 50 per cent of  rural and urban households by 
expenditure level.
3.4 SAM dimensions
The benchmark SAM for Kenya distinguishes 19 production activities, 
seven primary production factors including three sector-specific natural 
resource factors (forest, fish, and mineral stocks) beside skilled and 
unskilled labour, capital, and agricultural land, and four household 
categories. The Ghana SAM for the benchmark year contains 
18 production activities, eight primary factors including oil/gas 
resource stocks in addition to the same factors as in the Kenya SAM, 
and five household groups. Both SAMs contain 18 commodity groups 
(Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Crude Oil, Natural Gas, Other Mining, 
Beverages and Tobacco, Processed Food, Textiles and Clothing 
including Footwear and Leather Goods, Refined Petrol, Chemicals 
including Plastic and Rubber Goods, Other Light Manufacturing, 
Other Heavy Manufacturing, Electricity, Construction Services, Trade 
Services, Transport Services and Other Services).
3.5 Model calibration
The numerical calibration process involves the determination of  the 
initial model parameters in such a way that the equilibrium solution 
for the benchmark year exactly replicates the benchmark SAM. The 
selection of  values for the sectoral factor elasticities of  substitution, 
the elasticities of  substitution between imports and domestically 
produced output by commodity group, and the target income 
elasticities of  household demand is informed by available econometric 
evidence from secondary sources and uses estimates provided by 
the GTAP behavioural parameter database (Hertel and van der 
Mensbrugghe 2016).
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4 Dynamic scenario analysis: Kenya
4.1 Overview
The simulation analysis for Kenya considers four dynamic scenarios 
up to 2025 that differ with respect to (i) the evolution of  the power mix 
in on-grid electricity generation, and (ii) the evolution of  world market 
fossil fuel prices. Table 2 provides a concise outline of  the alternative 
scenario assumptions along these two dimensions.
The specification of  the lower-carbon scenarios is motivated by the 
results of  the comparative LCOE analysis by Pueyo et al. (2016, 2017) 
which indicates a clear cost advantage of  geothermal over all 
other electricity generation technologies, and by the presence of  a 
considerable potential for the further expansion of  geothermal capacity 
in the country. The consideration of  alternative conceivable time 
paths for the evolution of  international fossil fuel prices is motivated 
by the strong sensitivity of  the cost differences between thermal and 
renewables to fossil fuel price projections.
4.2 Baseline scenario
The dynamic baseline scenario provides a projection of  the evolution of  
Kenya’s economy up to 2025 under the assumptions that international oil 
and gas prices remain at low 2015/16 levels and that the evolution of  the 
electricity generation capacity from hydro, geothermal, and wind follows 
Kenya’s Ten-Year Power Sector Expansion Plan 2014–2024 (Republic of  
Kenya 2014) under the Plan’s moderate load growth scenario.
The construction of  the baseline scenario starts from the 2011 
benchmark SAM outlined in Section 3. For the period up to 2015, 
Table 2 Outline of scenarios for Kenya
Business-as-usual power mix Lower-carbon power mix
Low fossil fuel prices Baseline scenario Lower-carbon scenario
Power mix follows current Ten-Year Plan:
Rising share of Thermal
Falling share of Hydro
Constant share of Geothermal
Rising but small share of Wind
Falling share of Thermal
Falling share of Hydro
Rising Share of Geothermal
Rising but small share of Wind
Oil import price 50% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 55% below 2011 level
Oil import price 50% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 55% below 2011 level
High fossil fuel prices (HFFP) HFFP scenario Lower-carbon HFFP scenario
Power mix follows current Ten-Year Plan:
Rising share of Thermal
Falling share of Hydro
Constant share of Geothermal
Rising but small share of Wind
Falling share of Thermal
Falling share of Hydro
Rising Share of Geothermal
Rising but small share of Wind
Oil import price 19% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 17% below 2011 level
Oil import price 19% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 17% below 2011 level
Source Authors’ own.
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the forward projection takes account of  the most recent available data 
observations, while the projections from 2016 to 2025 draw upon expert 
forecasts for the determination of  the main model-exogenous drivers of  
economic growth.
Population and labour force growth is based on UNDESA (2015) 
medium-variant projections according to which the total population 
of  Kenya rises from 42.5 million in 2012 to 58.6 million in 2025. 
The second exogenous driver of  economic growth in the model is 
the economy-wide total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate, which 
reflects the speed of  autonomous technical progress. In the development 
of  the baseline scenario, the time path for the annual TFP growth 
rate is determined indirectly by imposing a target growth path for 
Kenya’s real gross domestic product (GDP) and by calibrating the TFP 
parameter of  the model dynamically to match this target growth path. 
The GDP baseline growth rates up to 2015 are the reported actual 
national accounts figures and the projections up to 2018 are taken from 
KIPPRA (2016). The assumed constant growth rate of  7.5 per cent per 
annum beyond 2018 is an optimistic compromise between the annual 
growth rate target of  10 per cent envisaged in Kenya’s aspirational 
Vision 2030 development plan (Republic of  Kenya 2007, 2013) for the 
same period and the growth rates projected by the CGE model under 
the assumption that TFP grows at a pace that is more in line with the 
country’s actual observed growth performance over recent years.
The assumed evolution of  the power mix in the baseline scenario draws 
upon Kenya’s Ten-Year Power Sector Expansion Plan 2014–2024 
(Republic of  Kenya 2014) while taking into account that under the 
assumed baseline economic growth path, the electricity demand growth 
over the simulation horizon endogenously generated by the CGE model 
is significantly lower than in the Ten-Year Plan.
As shown in Table 3, the baseline scenario assumes that hydro, 
geothermal, and wind generation evolves in line with the moderate load 
growth scenario of  the Ten-Year Plan while thermal (gas- and oil-fired) 
generation fills the gap between total demand and non-fossil-based 
supply. Correspondingly, the direction of  the changes in the power mix 
over the period 2015–25 are broadly in line with the Ten-Year Plan 
moderate scenario, in the sense that (i) the hydro share drops markedly 
despite a substantial increase in absolute capacity; (ii) the geothermal 
share remains roughly constant following the rapid increase over the 
period 2011–15, which means that absolute geothermal generation 
grows strongly and approximately in proportion to total electricity 
demand; (iii) the share of  thermal rises strongly; and (iv) the wind share 
roughly doubles but remains below 1 per cent. The main difference to 
the Ten-Year Plan scenario is that, due to the lower overall electricity 
demand growth, the baseline 2025 thermal share is slightly lower 
(35.2 per cent versus 39.2 per cent) and greener as it contains no 
coal-fired generation.
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4.3 Lower-carbon scenario
4.3.1 Scenario specification
Considering alternative conceivable pathways towards a less carbon-intensive 
power mix, the LCOE analysis for the Green Growth Diagnostics for 
Africa (GGDA) project by Pueyo et al. (2015) identifies geothermal electricity 
generation as the most promising technology option for Kenya. This 
assessment is in line with the Kenyan government’s own assessment:
In Kenya, more than 14 high temperature potential sites occur along the 
Rift Valley with an estimated potential of  more than 10,000MW. Other 
locations include Homa Hills in Nyanza, Mwananyamala at the Coast 
and Nyambene Ridges in Meru. The expansion to existing geothermal 
operations offers the least-cost, environmentally clean source of  energy 
(green) and highest potential to the country (Republic of  Kenya 2014: 101).
The following simulation analysis contemplates a deliberately drastic 
scenario in which the geothermal share in total domestic generation 
increases from 2018 onwards along a steep linear schedule to reach 75 per 
cent in 2025, so that the 2025 geothermal share is 23.6 percentage points 
higher than in the baseline. The thermal share drops correspondingly from 
35.2 per cent in the 2025 baseline to 11.6 per cent (Table 4 and Figure 1). 
The hydro and wind shares remain unchanged. In absolute terms, this 
assumed expansion of  geothermal electricity generation by 2025 is very 
close to the Ten-Year Plan’s least-cost high growth scenario, in which 
geothermal is projected to generate 26,000GWh by 2024. The falling share 
of  thermal does not imply an absolute contraction of  thermal generation. 
Given the strong overall electricity demand growth, thermal generation still 
grows year on year, albeit at a lower rate than in the baseline.
Table 3 Domestic electricity generation by type – baseline scenario
 Electricity generation (GWh)
Year Total Hydro Geothermal Thermal Wind
2011 7,250 3,427 1,453 2,352 18
2015 10,675 3,427 5,333 1,868 47
2020 22,735 4,466 11,343 6,829 97
2025 35,641 4,466 18,331 12,529 315
 Shares (%)
2011 100.0 47.3 20.0 32.4 0.2
2015 100.0 32.1 50.0 17.5 0.4
2020 100.0 19.6 49.9 30.0 0.4
2025 100.0 12.5 51.4 35.2 0.9
Source All figures for 2011 and all GWh figures for Hydro, Geothermal, and Wind:  
Republic of Kenya (2014: Tables 6 and 33). Domestic total generation figures are 
model-determined and Thermal shares beyond 2015 follow residually.
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Table 4 Geothermal and thermal shares in total power mix – lower-carbon scenario 
(percentage shares)
Year Baseline Lower-carbon
 Geothermal Thermal Geothermal Thermal
2015 50.0 17.5 50.0 17.5
2020 49.9 30.0 65.4 14.6
2025 51.4 35.2 75.0 11.6
Source Authors’ assumptions as explained in text.
Figure 1 Power mix in baseline and lower-carbon scenarios
Source Authors’ assumptions as explained in text.
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4.3.2 Results
The assumed gradual shift from high-cost thermal to lower-cost 
geothermal electricity generation entails a notable drop in the effective 
average supply price relative to the baseline scenario (Table 5). In 
2025, the domestic electricity price – here expressed relative to the 
equilibrium wage of  unskilled workers – is over 12 per cent lower than 
in the baseline scenario. The reduction in the cost of  electricity affects 
the production costs and thus the supply prices across all sectors and is 
more pronounced in sectors with a higher share of  electricity in total 
cost such as mining, the chemical industry, and heavy manufacturing 
than in sectors with a low power intensity.
The assumed low-carbon transition entails a strong reduction in fossil 
fuel imports. Both refined petrol and crude oil imports drop by nearly 
Hydro Geothermal Thermal Wind
Table 5 Sectoral impacts for Kenya – lower-carbon scenario (percentage deviations 
from baseline level 2025)
 Output Exports Imports Producer price
Agriculture 0.1 -1.6 2.8 -0.4
Forestry -0.6 -2.5 -0.3
Fishing 0.7 -1.4 -0.2
Crude oil – – -9.7 –
Mining -2.6 -2.7 1.6 -1.3
Food processing 0.2 -1.6 2.7 -0.4
Beverages and 
tobacco 0.6 -1.2 1.6 -0.4
Textiles and clothing -0.4 -1.6 2.4 -0.7
Petrol refining -9.7 -9.8 -1.2
Chemicals, rubber, 
plastics 0.3 0.0 1.5 -1.1
Other light 
manufacturing 0.1 -0.6 1.4 -0.9
Other heavy 
manufacturing 0.7 0.8 0.0 -1.4
Electricity 4.9 -12.5
Construction 1.0 -0.4
Trade services 0.1 2.0 -0.3
Transport services -0.8 -1.7 3.0 -0.7
Other services 0.6 -1.3 2.8 -0.3
Source Authors’ simulation results.  
Note The reported trade flow changes exclude commodity groups with negligible 
trade volumes.
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10 per cent in volume terms relative to the baseline scenario towards 
2025 (Table 5). The indirect effect on crude oil imports arises due to 
the fact that in the baseline scenario, Kenya’s domestic petrol-refining 
sector – which actually ceased production in the second half  of  2013 – 
is reactivated as envisaged in the 2015 National Energy and Petroleum 
Policy (Republic of  Kenya 2015). In the baseline projection, this sector 
operates at a modest scale using imported crude oil, with a negligible 
2025 baseline contribution to GDP and total employment.
As Kenya remains a net importer of  fossil fuels in the baseline scenario, 
the drop in the fossil fuel import bill is associated with a real exchange 
rate appreciation on the order of  0.7 per cent. The real appreciation 
lowers the prices of  imports relative to domestically produced goods 
from the perspective of  domestic residents. This induces a substitution 
effect towards imports for commodities in cases where the exchange rate 
effect dominates the simultaneous drop in the prices of  domestic output 
due to the electricity cost reduction in the new equilibrium. A further 
positive effect on imports across all final goods arises due to the positive 
aggregate real income effects associated with the shift towards lower-cost 
electricity generation. Thus, Table 5 shows moderate welfare-raising 
increases in the import quantities relative to baseline levels for most 
traded non-fuel goods and services, and these are generally more 
pronounced for the commodity groups with smaller domestic supply 
price reductions.
On the export side, the real exchange rate appreciation effect per se 
reduces in tendency the price of  exports relative to the price obtained 
in the domestic market from the viewpoint of  domestic producers, and 
thus shifts the optimal profit-maximising output mix between export 
and home market production in favour of  the latter. Correspondingly, 
Table 5 reports moderate drops in export quantities for most sectors. 
An exception is heavy manufacturing, which is the sector with the highest 
electricity cost share. In this case, the cost reduction effect dominates the 
exchange rate effect, so that exports expand. The trade effects can also 
be explained from a balance-of-payments perspective: the reduction in 
the fossil fuel import bill relaxes the balance-of-payments constraint as 
it allows domestic residents to enjoy simultaneously an increase in real 
imports and a higher share in domestically produced output, as less of  
that output needs to be shipped abroad to pay the import bill.
The equilibrium impact on real gross output by production sector for 
2025 compared to the baseline scenario is also shown in Table 5. The 
sectoral employment effects have the same direction and broadly the 
same orders of  magnitude, and are therefore not separately shown. 
Not surprisingly, in percentage terms the effect on the size of  the small 
domestic oil refinery sector in relation to the baseline is most pronounced 
as the demand growth for fuel by thermal power plants slows down.
It is worth emphasising that no sector contracts in absolute terms and thus 
no sector sheds existing workers along the dynamic scenario time path. 
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A negative-signed output effect in Table 5 merely indicates that the sector 
grows at a lower rate and that new workers are hired at a slower pace 
than in the baseline scenario, for example while the domestic refining 
sector at the 2025 endpoint of  the simulation horizon is projected to be 
nearly 10 per cent smaller than in the baseline scenario for the same year, 
the sector is still 127 per cent larger in 2025 than in 2017.
In line with economic theory, the real exchange appreciation tends to 
shift productive resources from traded to non-traded activities. Among 
the non-power sectors that expand relative to baseline are all sectors 
that have simultaneously negligible or small export/output shares and 
negligible or little competition from imports in their domestic market, 
such as construction services, the fishery sector, and trade services. In 
contrast, the small domestic mining sector with its baseline export–
output ratio of  over 75 per cent and an import share of  over 50 per cent 
in Kenya’s domestic demand for mining products is squeezed noticeably 
as mining exports drop and mining imports rise. The sectors that 
expand despite relatively high trade shares are heavy manufacturing 
and chemicals, which are among the most electricity-intensive sectors 
and thus benefit disproportionally from the reduction in energy input 
costs. However, the main message is that the effects of  the assumed 
low-carbon transition on the sectoral composition of  output and 
employment are very moderate.
The real resource savings associated with the switch to a lower-cost 
mode of  electricity generation is reflected in a moderately positive 
transitory effect on GDP growth, as shown in Figure 2. The cumulative 
effect of  the small annual growth rate increments reported in Figure 2 
over the period 2018–25 entails that the level of  real GDP by 2025 is 
1.1 per cent higher than in the baseline scenario.
Figure 2 Annual growth rates of real GDP for Kenya by scenario (in per cent)
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Turning to the effects on the functional income distribution – i.e. the 
distribution of  primary income by type of  factor – Figure 3 displays 
the impacts on real factor prices (i.e. nominal factor prices deflated 
by the consumer price index) in 2025 relative to the baseline level in 
the corresponding year. By 2025, the real returns to all factors except 
mineral resources are slightly higher than in the baseline. Capital 
returns rise relative to labour wages and the wage gap between skilled 
and unskilled increases marginally.
The differential factor price effect arises from factor intensity differentials 
between sectors that grow quicker and sectors that grow slower than in the 
baseline. On balance, the higher-growing sectors as a group are relatively 
skill- and capital-intensive and thus their additional factor input demand 
drives up capital returns and skilled wages more than unskilled wages.
For households with a single source of  factor income, Figure 3 directly 
indicates the direction of  the effects on total factor income. Figure 4 
shows the implications for mixed-income households with factor 
income mixes equal to the income compositions of  the four household 
categories the benchmark SAM. Both lower- and higher-income 
households gain. However, since the urban and rural high-income 
groups have higher shares of  capital and skilled labour in their total 
income mix than the low-income groups, the former groups gain 
disproportionally. In other words, the low-carbon transition has a 
pro-poor effect in an absolute or ‘weak’ sense (i.e. the poorer households 
are better off than in the baseline), but is not pro-poor in a relative or 
‘strong’ sense (i.e. the poorer households do not gain disproportionally).8
4.4 Sensitivity of results to future fossil fuel prices
As the cost differentials between thermal and renewable technologies 
are necessarily contingent on the assumptions about future fossil fuel 
Figure 3 Impact on factor returns in Kenya by scenario (percentage deviation 
of factor prices relative to consumer price index (CPI) from baseline or high 
fossil-fuel price (HFFP) level 2025)
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prices over the lifetime of  thermal power plants, and the results of  
the quantitative low-carbon scenario analysis are driven by the size 
of  these cost differentials, we now briefly assess the sensitivity of  the 
findings in the previous section to a variation in the assumed exogenous 
international fossil fuel price time paths. In contrast to the baseline 
scenario, crude oil and refined petrol world prices are now assumed to 
return to higher levels beyond 2016. More specifically, between 2016 
and 2018 oil prices rise linearly to a level that is 62 per cent higher 
than the 2018 baseline price (but still 19 per cent lower than the 2011 
benchmark price) and then stay put at that level beyond 2018.
The high fossil fuel price (HFFP) scenario under baseline assumptions 
about the power mix provides the relevant reference scenario for 
comparison with the HFFP lower-carbon scenario. As the purpose of  this 
study is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of  the sensitivity of  Kenya’s 
economy to oil price shocks, the exposition of  this reference scenario can 
be concise and focuses on key differences to the baseline scenario.
In macroeconomic terms, the simulated oil price shock is an adverse 
terms-of-trade shock, i.e. the aggregate ratio of  import prices paid by 
Kenya to export prices paid by the rest of  the world for Kenya’s exports 
rises. Thus, Kenya must devote more domestic productive resources 
to export production at the expense of  production for the home 
market in order to pay for the higher import bill. The welfare-reducing 
terms-of-trade shock requires a real exchange depreciation on the order 
of  7.6 per cent by 2025 relative to the baseline. The depreciation effect 
discourages imports and stimulates exports. The effects on GDP growth 
are displayed in Figure 2. GDP growth rates are hit strongly initially and 
then recover partially as international oil prices settle at the new higher 
level and the economy adapts to the shock. By 2025, the annual growth 
rate is still about 0.7 percentage points below the baseline growth rate. 
The simulation results suggest that by 2025 the level of  GDP would be 
some 9 per cent below base.
Figure 4 Impact on real household income – lower-carbon scenario (percentage 
deviation from baseline level 2020 and 2025)
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Since higher fossil fuel prices increase the cost advantage of  geothermal 
vis-à-vis thermal power generation, the positive effect of  the shift to a 
higher geothermal share on real GDP growth is noticeably stronger 
than in the previous lower-carbon scenario. The cumulative effect of  
the increases in annual GDP growth means that by 2025 GDP is 2.6 per 
cent higher than in the HFFP reference scenario. The corresponding 
GDP increase reported in Section 4.3 for the low-oil-price case 
amounted to 1.1 per cent.
The real exchange rate appreciation associated with the lower 
dependency on fossil fuel imports is on the order of  1.2 per cent 
by 2025 and thus likewise slightly more pronounced than the 
corresponding real appreciation of  0.7 per cent reported in Section 4.3. 
The general pattern of  the sectoral effects is the same as in the earlier 
lower-carbon scenario, but in quantitative terms the sectoral changes in 
output, employment, and trade flows are again moderately stronger.
The same conclusion applies to the impacts on the functional income 
distribution (Figure 3), except for the impact of  the low-carbon transition 
on the real returns to agricultural land. The export–output ratio of  
agriculture is higher in the HFFP reference scenario than in the baseline 
scenario, since Kenya needs to export more to pay for the higher 
fossil-fuel import bill. Thus, the stronger real appreciation under the 
HFFP low-carbon scenario which slows down agricultural export growth 
has a stronger effect on agricultural output growth than in the low-carbon 
scenario under low oil prices. As a result, agricultural land rents grow 
slightly slower than in the HFFP reference scenario up to 2025.
5 Dynamic scenario analysis: Ghana
5.1 Overview
The scenario design for the Ghana study follows the same basic logic 
as the Kenya study (Table 2). The specification of  the lower-carbon 
scenarios is again motivated by the results of  the LCOE analysis by 
Pueyo et al. (2016, 2017), as detailed in Section 5.3.
5.2 Baseline scenario
The construction of  the baseline scenario starts from the 2011 
benchmark SAM for Ghana outlined in Section 3. According to the 
UNDESA (2015) medium-variant projections used here, the total 
population of  Ghana rises from 25.5 million in 2012 to 33.7 million 
in 2025. The GDP baseline scenario growth rates up to 2014 are 
the reported official national accounts figures (GSS 2015) and the 
projections up to 2018 are taken from World Bank (2016). For the 
period beyond 2019, it is assumed that annual GDP continues to grow 
at rates just below the World Bank forecast for 2017/18. The growth 
rates imply that aggregate GDP in 2025 is 2.7 times higher than in 2011 
and per capita GDP doubles over this period.
The assumed evolution of  the on-grid power mix in the baseline takes 
account of  the Strategic National Energy Plan 2006–2020 (EnCG 2006), 
the Energy Sector Strategy and Development Plan (Ministry of  Energy 
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2010), the Ministry of  Petroleum’s Gas Master Plan (Republic of  Ghana 
2015a), the Ghana Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Programme (SREP) 
(Republic of  Ghana 2015b), and is also informed by a range of  other 
sources including World Bank (2013), EnCG (2016), and IRENA (2015).
The key assumptions for the construction of  the baseline scenario are that 
(i) hydro capacity remains constant beyond 2015 up to 2025, i.e. the hydro 
share drops as total generation grows (Figure 5); (ii) the on-grid share of  
non-hydro renewables remains negligibly small, i.e. the binding constraints 
to investments in renewable energy capacity in Ghana identified by Pueyo 
et al. (2017) are not relaxed, and thus Ghana’s official aspirational target 
to reach a renewable share (excluding large-scale hydro) of  10 per cent 
by 2020 is not achieved; (iii) the rising gap between hydro generation 
and total demand for electricity is entirely bridged by additional thermal 
generation, and thus the share of  thermal in total generation is rising; and 
(iv) the share of  gas in total thermal generation is rapidly rising from 2018 
onwards. In line with Ghana’s Gas Master Plan and the recommendations 
in World Bank (2013), the baseline scenario assumes further that natural 
gas extraction from domestic sources develops at a fast pace, so that by the 
2020s a significant fraction of  the expanding gas demand by the power 
sector is covered by domestically sourced supplies.
5.3 Lower-carbon scenario
5.3.1 Scenario specification
Pueyo et al. (2016) suggest that in comparison to Kenya, Ghana’s 
renewable energy potential is considerably smaller and presently hydro 
is the only renewable energy option with a clear cost advantage over 
gas-fired thermal generation, yet the potential for a further expansion 
of  hydro capacity is limited. Based on IRENA (2015) estimates for 
Ghana’s untapped small- and medium-scale hydro power expansion 
potential, we consider a moderate lower-carbon transition scenario in 
which the hydro share in total generation by 2025 is seven percentage 
Table 6 Outline of scenarios for Ghana
Baseline power mix Lower-carbon power mix
Low fossil fuel prices Baseline scenario
Rising share of Thermal
Falling share of Hydro
Lower-carbon scenario
Less steep rise of Thermal share
Less steep drop of Hydro share
Oil import price 50% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 55% below 2011 level
Oil import price 50% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 55% below 2011 level
High fossil fuel prices (HFFP) HFFP scenario
Rising share of Thermal
Falling share of Hydro
Lower-carbon HFFP scenario
Less steep rise of Thermal share
Less steep drop of Hydro share
Oil import price 19% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 17% below 2011 level
Oil import price 19% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 17% below 2011 level
Source Authors’ own.
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points higher than in the baseline scenario, and the 2025 thermal share 
drops from 83 per cent to 76 per cent. IRENA estimates suggest that the 
LCOE ‘for new small hydropower projects is between 3 US cents and 
11.5 US cents/KWh in developing countries’,9 which is within the range 
of  the LCOE estimate used for the initial calibration of  the hydro sector 
parameters in the CGE model for Ghana (Table 1).
5.3.2 Results
The moderate and gradual shift from thermal to hydro electricity 
generation entails modest changes in the system-wide average cost of  
electricity production over the period 2018–25. By 2025, the electricity 
supply price in this scenario is a moderate 1.1 per cent lower than in the 
baseline.
The dynamic macroeconomic adjustment process in this scenario is 
complicated by the fact that the baseline hydro-thermal generation cost 
differential endogenously generated by the CGE model has a hump-
shaped time profile as shown in Figure 6: over the period 2015–17, 
the thermal generation costs drop sharply relative to hydro unit costs, 
so that by 2017 the initial cost advantage of  hydro turns into cost 
disadvantage. Beyond 2017, this trend reverses as the thermal unit cost 
begins to rise relative to the hydro unit cost, and beyond 2021 hydro 
restores its status as the least-cost electricity technology.
Primarily, three features of  the baseline scenario drive this peculiar time 
path of  the hydro-thermal cost differential. First, fossil fuel import prices 
and particularly gas prices drop strongly over the period 2015–17, and 
entail a sharp drop in the thermal generation cost over this period. 
Second, the strong increase in demand for thermal electricity associated 
with the rise in the thermal share over the whole simulation horizon 
drives up the equilibrium rate of  return to capital in the thermal sector 
– i.e. the return on investments in thermal capacity must rise in order 
to attract the new capital required for the expansion of  the thermal 
sector. This effect raises the cost of  capital in the thermal sector. 
Figure 5 Electricity generation shares in baseline and lower-carbon scenario
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Third, as Ghana has an initial trade deficit with the rest of  the world 
and the foreign savings required to cover the trade deficit grow at a 
lower exogenous rate than Ghana’s real income and import demand, 
the real exchange rate depreciates slightly over the entire simulation 
interval. Thus, while fossil fuel prices remain constant beyond 2017 in 
foreign currency terms, they rise gradually from 2018 to 2025 from the 
perspective of  domestic firms and households due to the depreciation 
effect. The first effect dominates the time profile of  the hydro-thermal 
cost differential up to 2017, while the second and third effect become 
jointly dominant after 2018.
The small direct electricity cost reduction effect towards 2025 triggers 
only weak intersectoral spillover effects via input–output linkages and 
other general equilibrium repercussions. The equilibrium effects on the 
supply prices of  other sectors are generally tiny. The only noteworthy 
indirect price effect is the 0.8 per cent drop in the domestic natural gas 
supply price. This effect occurs since the thermal sector expands at a 
lower rate than in the baseline, and thus its demand for gas grows at a 
lower rate.
For the same reason, fossil fuel imports drop relative to the baseline. As 
in the case of  Kenya, the reduction in the fossil fuel import bill entails a 
mild real exchange rate appreciation effect, i.e. the additional ‘space’ in 
Ghana’s external balance-of-payments account created by the reduced 
fossil fuel import payments enables a simultaneous increase in the 
volume of  non-fuel imports and a reduction in the volume of  exports 
that must be shipped to the rest of  the world in order to pay for imports.
In an aggregate macroeconomic sense, the net welfare effect for Ghana 
associated with the low-carbon transition scenario considered here is 
unambiguously positive: using virtually the same total real resources 
as in the baseline, Ghana can simultaneously command a higher real 
volume of  imports and retain a higher share of  total domestic output as 
less of  this output is exported than in the baseline.
This positive welfare effect is reflected in a positive but very small increase 
in real GDP. The cumulative effect of  the tiny annual growth rate 
Figure 6 Ratio of average hydro to average thermal generation cost, 2015–2025
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increments reported in Figure 7 over the period 2021–25 entails that 
the level of  real GDP by 2025 is a negligible 0.025 per cent higher than 
in the baseline scenario. Part of  the reason for the small GDP effect is 
that between 2018 and 2020 the low-carbon transition initially raises the 
average price of  electricity (by about 1 per cent) due to the hump-shaped 
time profile of  the hydro-thermal cost differential discussed previously. A 
further reason is that the reduction in demand for domestic natural gas 
by the thermal sector leads to a small reduction in the primary resource 
extraction activity of  the domestic fossil fuel sector. In economic terms, 
this means a reduction in the supply of  a primary production factor which 
entails per se a negative effect on real GDP. However, this effect is likewise 
tiny: the 2025 supply of  domestic fossil fuel primary resources drops by 
1.8 per cent, while the baseline contribution of  this factor to GDP is about 
2 per cent – so the effect on real GDP is well below 0.05 per cent.
Figure 7 Annual growth rate of real GDP for Ghana by scenario (in per cent)
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Figure 8 Impact on factor returns in Ghana by scenario (percentage deviation of 
factor prices relative to CPI from baseline level 2025)
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Figures 8 and 9 report the effects on the functional distribution 
of  income and real factor income by household type for 2025. 
Unsurprisingly, the impacts are again tiny. As in the case of  Kenya, the 
distribution impact is slightly regressive in tendency as by 2025 capital 
and skilled labour gain slightly in relation to other factors.
5.4 Sensitivity of results to future fossil fuel prices
5.4.1 HFFP scenario
The world market crude oil price increase under the HFFP scenario 
incentivises a marked rise in Ghana’s crude oil export supply and the 
domestic fossil fuel extraction sector expands vis-à-vis the baseline. Due 
to the large thermal share in total electricity generation by 2025, the 
cost-push effect on the price of  electricity is strong (+38 per cent). The 
supply prices of  non-energy sectors with relatively high energy cost 
(direct fuel plus electricity) shares in total production costs including the 
chemical industry, heavy and light manufacturing, other mining, and 
transport services are likewise pushed up significantly, and the growth of  
these sectors slows down accordingly.
In the baseline scenario, Ghana remains a marginal net fossil fuel 
importer despite its crude oil exports, and thus the rise in international 
fossil fuel prices is an adverse terms-of-trade shock for the country. 
However, due to the additional crude oil export revenue growth in the 
HFFP scenario, the absolute size of  the annual net fossil fuel import bill 
relative to the baseline scenario becomes smaller over time, and thus 
towards 2025 Ghana needs to earn less non-fuel export revenue than in 
the baseline to pay for the net fossil fuel import bill. This is a noteworthy 
difference to the HFFP scenario for Kenya discussed in Section 4.4.
Figure 7 shows the effects on GDP growth. As in the case of  Kenya, GDP 
growth rates are hit strongly by the initially higher energy costs and then 
start to recover as international oil prices settle at the new higher level and 
the economy adapts to the shock. In contrast to Kenya, however, from 
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Figure 9 Impact on real household income in Ghana by scenario (percentage 
deviation from baseline level or HFFP level 2025)
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2023 onwards GDP growth rates start to overshoot the baseline rates. The 
reason for this effect is that the expansion of  the domestic fossil fuel sector 
is associated with a higher rate of  domestic natural resource extraction 
than in the baseline. By 2023, the impact of  this increase in the supply 
of  a primary production factor on total economy-wide value-added is 
sufficiently strong to dominate the growth-depressing effects of  higher 
energy prices on the annual growth rate. However, this effect is not strong 
enough to push the level of  GDP above the baseline path: by 2025, real 
GDP is still 3.2 per cent below baseline level.
It is important to note that the hump-shaped time profile of  the 
hydro-thermal cost differential (Figure 6) does not occur in the HFFP 
scenarios: since fossil fuel prices remain high over the entire 2015–25 
period, the hydro-thermal unit cost ratio remains below unity throughout.
5.4.2 HFFP lower-carbon scenario
Higher fossil fuel prices increase the cost advantage of  hydro vis-à-vis 
thermal power generation, and so the impact of  the transition towards 
a higher hydro share entails a stronger reduction of  the electricity than 
in the low-carbon scenario of  Section 5.3: by 2025, the electricity price 
is 6.2 per cent lower than in the HFFP reference scenario, whereas in 
the low-carbon scenario with low fossil fuel prices, the electricity price 
impact is only -1.1 per cent.
Moreover, since in contrast to the previous low-carbon scenario the hydro 
cost advantage now prevails over the entire 2018–25 period, the gradual 
downward shift in electricity prices begins right at the start of  the transition 
process in 2018, whereas in the low-carbon scenario with low fossil fuel 
prices the same transition entails an initial electricity price increase due to 
the hump-shaped time profile of  the hydro-thermal cost differential.
However, the reduction in demand for domestic natural gas by the 
thermal sector and the real appreciation effect due to the reduced net 
fossil fuel import bill again leads to a small reduction in the primary 
resource extraction activity of  the domestic fossil fuel sector. This effect 
entails per se a negative impact on real GDP. By 2022, this effect begins 
to slightly dominate the growth-enhancing effect of  lower electricity 
prices. The cumulative impact of  these miniscule effects on annual 
GDP growth rates remains small: by 2020, the level of  real GDP in 
the HFFP low-carbon scenario is 0.1 per cent higher and by 2025, 
0.11 per cent lower than in the HFFP reference scenario.
Thus, in contrast to the corresponding analysis for Kenya, the 
quantitative impact of  the lower-carbon transition in the electricity 
sector on macroeconomic growth in Ghana is not particularly sensitive 
to variations in the assumptions about international fossil fuel prices: 
both in the low-carbon scenario and the HFFP low-carbon scenario 
the impacts on real GDP remain negligibly small despite the qualitative 
differences across the two scenarios. Also in contrast to the findings for 
Kenya, higher fossil fuel prices do not enlarge but rather reduce the 
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beneficial impacts of  a transition from thermal to lower-cost renewable 
electricity generation in the case of  Ghana. The main reason for these 
differences is related to the endogenous changes in domestic fossil fuel 
resource extraction that occur in the case of  Ghana but not in the case 
of  Kenya. Impacts on the functional distribution of  income and the 
distribution by household quintile remain small (Figures 8 and 9).
6 Conclusions
The present study applies purpose-built dynamic CGE models for 
Ghana and Kenya with a disaggregated country-specific representation 
of  the power sector, to simulate the prospective medium-run growth 
and distributional implications associated with a shift towards a higher 
share of  renewables in the power mix, up to 2025.
In both countries, the share of  fossil fuel-based thermal electricity 
generation in the power mix will increase sharply over the next decade and 
beyond according to current national energy sector development plans.
Kenya has a considerable potential for a further expansion of  
geothermal electricity generation and existing estimates suggest 
a significant cost advantage of  geothermal over thermal power 
generation. In line with this assessment, the simulation analysis for 
Kenya considers a stylised low-carbon transition scenario in which 
the geothermal share in total domestic on-grid electricity generation 
increases along a steep linear schedule, so that the 2025 geothermal 
share is 24 percentage points higher than in the baseline scenario.
The higher share of  low-cost geothermal in the power mix reduces 
electricity prices and mildly stimulates economic growth. The associated 
reduction in the fossil fuel import bill triggers a moderate real exchange 
rate appreciation, which reduces the prices of  imports faced by 
domestic producers and households and entails a further economy-wide 
real income gain. The size of  these beneficial aggregate effects depends 
on the evolution of  international fossil fuel prices over the simulation 
horizon: under a low-carbon transition scenario with low world market 
fossil fuel prices, real GDP in 2025 is about 1.1 per cent higher than 
in the baseline scenario. In a low-carbon scenario with high fossil fuel 
import price scenario, real GDP in 2025 is more than 2 per cent higher 
than in the corresponding HFFP baseline scenario. All household 
groups gain, but urban and rural higher-income households gain 
relatively more than urban and rural low-income households, because 
skilled real wages and real returns to capital rise slightly more than 
unskilled wages and returns to land. Impacts on the sectoral structure 
of  production are generally small. In tendency, sectors with a higher 
baseline share of  electricity costs in total production cost expand relative 
to sectors with a low electricity cost share.
In comparison to Kenya, Ghana’s potential for an economically viable 
expansion of  renewable on-grid power generation is considerably 
smaller. Moreover, in contrast to Kenya, Ghana has an already active 
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domestic fossil fuel extraction sector and is planning to satisfy a 
significant share of  the fuel demand of  its expanding gas-fired thermal 
generation using domestic natural gas resources. The available levelised 
cost estimates suggest that in the case of  Ghana presently, hydro is the 
only renewable energy option with a clear cost advantage over gas-fired 
thermal generation, yet the potential for a further expansion of  hydro 
capacity is limited. In line with this assessment, the simulation analysis 
for Ghana considers a moderate lower-carbon transition scenario in 
which the hydro share in total generation by 2025 is seven percentage 
points higher than in the baseline scenario and the 2025 thermal share 
drops from 83 per cent to 76 per cent.
This moderate electricity sector transition shock generates only marginal 
impacts on macroeconomic growth. The presence of  a domestic fossil fuel 
extraction sector in Ghana changes the qualitative nature of  the dynamic 
adjustment to the transition shock in relation to the case of  Kenya. As 
in the analysis for Kenya, the partial shift to lower-cost renewable power 
generation reduces the cost of  electricity and this per se stimulates economic 
growth. However, the associated drop in demand for domestic natural gas 
by the electricity sector slightly dampens the growth of  domestic natural 
resource extraction, and this reduction in primary factor supply growth 
per se reduces real GDP growth. Thus, in the case of  Ghana, these two 
effects drag GDP in opposite directions and the net effect is miniscule. 
Similar to Kenya, the impacts on the sectoral structure of  domestic 
production are small and thus the effects on relative factor prices that 
determine the functional income distribution remain unremarkable.
The overarching general message suggested by the simulation results 
presented here is that in both countries it appears feasible to reduce 
the carbon content of  electricity generation significantly without 
adverse consequences for economic growth and without noteworthy 
distributional effects.
Notes
1 Sue Wing (2009) and Kemfert and Truong (2009) survey this 
literature. For a concise recent survey of  the small number of  CGE 
studies concerned with a low-carbon energy transition in developing 
countries, see Pueyo et al. (2015: 52–59).
2 See e.g. Robinson, Willenbockel and Strzepek (2012) for an earlier 
recursive-dynamic extension of  the standard model.
3 See e.g. Böhringer and Löschel (2004), Böhringer, Löschel and 
Rutherford (2009), and Willenbockel and Hoa (2011). For further 
reference to the literature on energy-focused top-down CGE models, 
see Pueyo et al. (2015: Chapter 6).
4 Examples for the development and application of  such hybrid 
top-down bottom-up models include inter alia McFarland, Reilly 
and Herzog (2004), Böhringer and Löschel (2006), Sue Wing (2008), 
Böhringer and Rutherford (2008, 2013), Sassi et al. (2010), Boeters 
and Koornneef  (2011), Lanz and Rausch (2011), Okagawa et al. 
(2012), Proenca and St. Aubin (2013), and Fortes et al. (2013).
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5 In the recent low-carbon development literature, the deployment 
of  decentralised renewable energy systems is widely seen as a 
promising and economically viable approach to reducing energy 
poverty in remote rural areas (see Willenbockel 2015: 171–72 for 
further reference), and thus the incorporation of  such scenarios in 
future research appears desirable. However, assessing the scope for a 
cost-effective expansion of  stand-alone renewable energy generation as 
an alternative to centralised grid supply is a complex task and requires 
spatially explicit modelling, as exemplified by Deichmann et al. (2011) 
for Ethiopia, Ghana, and Kenya. For a study of  the evolution of  the 
solar home system market in Kenya see Byrne et al. (2014).
6 The raw data for the Ghana country bloc of  the GTAP database 
include a SAM for 2005 constructed by Breisinger, Thurlow and 
Duncan (2007) and the raw data for Kenya in GTAP include a 2001 
SAM developed at the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research 
and Analysis (KIPPRA) in collaboration with the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), a predecessor of  the latest 
available KIPPRA–IFPRI SAM for 2003 (Kiringai, Thurlow and 
Wanjala 2006). In the case of  Kenya, the GTAP input–output 
data have been triangulated with information from more recent 
unpublished supply-and-use tables (SUTs) provided by Dr Bernadette 
Wanjala (KIPPRA). Following minor revisions in the course of  this 
triangulation process, the SAM has been rebalanced using a variant 
of  the cross-entropy approach proposed by Robinson, Cattaneo and 
El-Said (2001). For Ghana, no recent SUT data are available.
7 See Willenbockel, Osiolo and Bawakyillenuo (2017) for further 
elaboration. See Peters and Hertel (2016a, 2016b) for a detailed 
discussion and comparison of  existing matrix-balancing algorithms 
commonly used in this context and further references to the related 
technical literature.
8 See Willenbockel (2015) for critical reflections on the recent literature 
concerned with pro-poor low-carbon development in this context.
9 http://costing.irena.org/technology-costs/power-generation/
hydropower.aspx (accessed December 2016).
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